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Lyft, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 86 (Dec. 30, 2021)1
Civil Practice: NRS 52.380(3) is Procedural and Conflicts with NRCP 35
Summary:
Lyft challenged the district court’s decision overruling their objection to the discovery
commissioner’s recommendation that medical examinations during civil discovery are governed
under NRS 52.380, not the Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 35.2 NRS 52.380 was created
after the Court amended NRCP 35.3 Lyft requested a writ of mandamus requesting this Court to
instruct the district court to vacate its order that NRS 52.380 controls the process. This Court finds
that NRS 52.380 is unconstitutional as it conflicts with NRCP 35. The Court granted the petition
to vacate the decision and requests the lower court to review the motions according to NRCP 35.
Facts and Procedural History:
Petitioner Lyft, Inc. operates a ridesharing networking in which one of its vehicles hit the
real party in interest, Kalena Davis. Due to the collision, Davis suffered severe injuries and sued
Lyft for negligence asserting $11.8 million in damages. Lyft disputed liability and had its experts
contest the number of damages. Lyft filed a motion to compel Davis to undergo a physical and
mental examination with its experts. They asserted that NRCP 35 should govern the procedure.
Davis challenged the motion claiming that an examination was not warranted because good cause
was not shown.
In response, the discovery commissioner issued a report and recommendation that Lyft did
satisfy the good cause requirement because Davis’s condition was in dispute. Davis asserted that
NRS 52.380 should govern the examination process. The commissioner issued another report
claiming that NRCP 35 and NRS 52.380 conflict. The commissioner concluded that NRS 52.380
supersedes NRCP 35 without legal support. Lyft filed an objection to the recommendation. The
district court did not hold a hearing but overruled the objection. Lyft filed a writ of mandamus.
Discussion:
This issue before the Court is whether NRS 52.380 supersedes NRCP 35 regarding medical
examinations during discovery in civil litigation?
The Court Will Entertain Lyft’s Writ Petition
The Court retains the discretion as to whether they will entertain a writ petition and it is
not mandatory.4 It considers different factors as to whether they will review a petition (i.e., judicial
economy).5 The Court is likely to exercise their discretion when a question is prone to repetition
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and clarification is warranted.6 A review is appropriate in cases pertaining to substantial public
policy concerns or precedent.7 Here, the Court found that many parties may be subject to undergo
a medical examination during the civil discovery process. Since either NRS 52.380 or NRCP 35
may govern, the Court finds that clarification is necessary to avoid district courts producing
different outcomes. Thus, the Court determined that it would review the writ.
NRS 52.380 Plainly Conflicts with NRCP 35
In this instance, the parties do not agree on whether NRS 52.380 violates the separation of
powers doctrine between the legislature and judiciary. Before the Court can reach this conclusion,
they must first assess whether the two rules conflict with each other or can co-exist. Lyft argues
that NRS 52.380 and NRCP 35 conflict. Davis argues that the NRCP outlines the general
procedural rules, whereas NRS 52.380 provides the examinee’s substantive rights. This includes
the right to have an attorney present and audio record the medical examination.
NRCP 35, which this Court amended, applies in civil actions where a party’s “mental or
physical condition…is in controversy” and the opposing party seeks to have an “examination by a
suitably licensed or certified examiner.”8 This rule is limited because a party must request that the
other party undergo an examination only when there is a “motion for good cause.” 9 NRCP 35 is
modeled after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 35, which provides the conditions of
the examination process. The Supreme Court explicitly interpreted that the “good cause”
requirement is met when there is “an affirmative showing by the movant that each condition as to
which the examination is sought is really and genuinely in controversary.” 10 That means that
conclusory allegations provided in the pleadings or mere relevance are insufficient.11 Specifically,
the conditions in contention under NRCP 35 are subsections (a)(3) relating to audio recordings 12
and (a)(4) detailing when and by whom is allowed during the examination process. 13 Both
subsections grant the district court the opportunity to exercise its discretion when determining if a
good cause is met.
Similarly, NRS 52.380 regulates the conditions of “a mental or physical examination
ordered by a court for the purpose of discovery in a civil action.” 14 For this case, the subsection in
dispute allows an observer, even an attorney, to automatically attend and record any examination. 15
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Therefore, the Court finds that each party’s argument about who can observe and whether
recordings are permissible may be governed by either NRS 52.380 or NRCP 35, causing them to
conflict.
An Observer’s Presence at the Physical or Mental Examination
NRCP 35(a)(4) allows the party undergoing the examination to request “to have an
observer present at the examination.”16 However, the rule explicitly bars the same party’s attorney,
or anyone affiliated with the attorney, from attending the examination. 17 In comparison, NRS
52.380(1) allows any observer to attend (including their attorney). The statute does not leave room
for the district court to exercise its discretion regarding who can attend the examination. Thus, the
Court finds that the statute attempts to revoke NRCP 35 by removing the good cause requirement
because anyone can attend the examination automatically.
An Audio Recording of the Mental or Physical Examination
If the court finds good cause to audio record the examination, NRCP 35(a)(4) allows them
to grant this request.18 In comparison, NRS 52.380(3) does not include any language setting forth
a good cause requirement.19 Instead, it allows the observer to record the examination if they wish.
Therefore, NRS 52.380(3) conflicts with NRCP 35 because it removes the district court’s
discretion to determine when audio recordings are permissible.
NRS 52.380 Violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine
When determining whether NRS 52.380 violates the separation of powers doctrine, the
Court will presume that the statute is valid and review it de novo. 20 The separation of powers
doctrine was intended to preclude “one branch of government from encroaching on […]
another.”21 When rules conflict, the Court must determine if the rules are procedural or substantive.
The Supreme Court held that substantive law “create duties, rights, and obligations, while a
procedural standard specifies how those duties, rights, and obligations should be enforced.” 22
Lyft asserts that the separation of powers doctrine was violated because both rules are
procedural since they outline the medical examination process. In its view, both rules only exist
because of the underlying substantive claim. 23 However, Davis asserts that NRS 52.380 is
substantive statute because it grants the party the right to determine who can observe the
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examination and if recordings are permissible. 24 Here, the Court rejects the argument that NRS
52.380 is substantive for two reasons. First, NRS 52.380 is invoked after a party brings forth a
civil claim and is not applicable outside of civil discovery. Second, the statute does not provide a
legally cognizable claim for relief. 25
The Supreme Court previously held that FRCP 35 (NRCP 35’s counterpart) is procedural
because it enforces the rights and duties of a party during the examination.26 In addition, the Court
found that a Nevada District Court already reached the same conclusion that NRS 52.380 is
procedural.27 Thus, this Court agrees with the federal authorities that NRS 52.380 is procedural
because it only details the process of how to conduct the examination. That said, it conflicts with
the Court’s ability to regulate NRCP 35, which was already an existing rule by the time the statute
was enacted. Therefore, NRS 52.380 is unconstitutional and cannot be reconciled with NRCP 35.
Conclusion:
Therefore, the Court finds that NRS 52.380 violates the separation of powers doctrine due
to its procedural nature. NRCP 35 already exists and covers this process. The Court grants Lyft’s
petition to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its order to affirmatively
adopt the discovery commissioner’s conclusion that NRS 52.380 supersedes NRCP 35. The Court
finds that this was an abuse of their discretion.28 Thus, the district court must reassess whether
good cause is present under NRCP 35. If so, then Davis can have their attorney observe and
possibly audio record the examination.
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